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RECOMMENDATION
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association recommends that the Congress and
the President of the United States enact amendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act ("FSIA" or "Act") in accordance with the following principles:
(1) Amend the FSIA throughout to separate the definitions of "foreign state" and "agency
or instrumentality" for all purposes, and amend section 1603 to (a) clarify the term "foreign
state" to include the government of the State and its departments, ministries, armed forces,
and independent regulatory agencies; and (b) shorten the phrase "agency or instrumental-
ity" to just "instrumentality."
(2) Amend section 1603 to apply the Act to entities owned by more than one foreign
state and to add to that section a provision to avoid the application of the FSIA to any entity
designated under the International Organizations Immunities Act.
(3) Amend section 1603 to apply the Act to individuals who are officials or employees of
a foreign state or instrumentality and who act within the scope of their office or employ-
ment, adding appropriate new provisions for service on individuals and provisions expressly
preserving diplomatic, consular, or other immunity from suit or service under any treaty,
other international agreement, or other federal statute of the United States. This amend-
ment would not apply the Act to heads of state.
(4) Amend the waiver exception in section 1605(a)(1) to limit implied waivers to those
situations in which a foreign state or instrumentality participates as a defendant in litigation
without properly raising or preserving a defense of sovereign immunity and to specify the
choice-of-law rule for determining a person's actual or apparent authority to waive sover-
eign immunity.
(5) Amend the commercial activity exception in section 1605(a)(2) to remove immunity
for claims "based upon a legal obligation to make a payment at a location in the United
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States in connection with commercial activity," to require a "substantial" and direct effect
in the United States when applying the third clause dealing with commercial activity and
acts occurring outside of the United States, and to clarify that the types of claims that may
not be brought under the tort exception, such as defamation, deceit, and malicious prose-
cution, may be brought under the commercial activity exception.
(6) Amend the tort exception in section 1605(a)(5) to make it available when a substantial
portion of the tortious act or omission occurs in the United States, without regard to the
place of injury or damage.
(7) Amend the service provisions of section 1608 to require strict enforcement of the
service rules on both foreign states and instrumentalities and to encourage courts to find
satisfactory service approaches when a plaintiff has difficulty serving an instrumentality or
directors or employees of an instrumentality.
(8) Amend the execution provisions in section 1610 to relax the restrictions on executing
a judgment against a foreign state by making any property of a foreign state in the United
States used for a commercial activity available to satisfy a U.S. judgment, although retaining
the immunity of specific categories of property and clarifying that official, diplomatic, and
consular property are not subject to execution.
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association recommends that
(1) U.S. courts determine whether an entity is separate from the foreign state itself by
reviewing legal characteristics such as whether the entity maintains a distinct personality,
was sufficiently capitalized, observes corporate formalities, contracts in its own name, and
is able to sue and be sued, (2) that U.S. courts satisfy themselves, using traditional methods
of contract interpretation, that a foreign state or instrumentality's explicit waiver of im-
munity was a consent to be sued in the United States, and (3) that the U.S. courts continue
their incremental interpretation of the discretionary function provision in the tort exception
to immunity.
FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association does not recommend any
alteration in the current structure of the FSIA combining issues of personal jurisdiction,
federal court jurisdiction, and immunity from suit.
REPORT
A. INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of the United States ("FSIA" or "Act")' is, as the
Supreme Court said, "the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our
courts."2 Although now over 20 years old, this important and complex statute has a variety
I. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(4), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (2002).
2. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-
1487 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6610 (Act contains the "sole and exclusive standards to be used
in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts in the
United States") [subsequent citations to the House Report will be to the page of the "1976 U.S.C.C.A.N."
only].
There is extension commentary on the FSIA. See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments
and Their Corporations (2d ed. 2002); Mark W.Janis, An Introduction to International Law 350-58 (3rd ed. 1998);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 451-460 (1987) [hereinafter
THIRD RESTATEMENT]; Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble, International Law ch. 6 (3d ed. 1995); Louis
Henkin et al., International Law 1126-87 (3d ed. 1993); David Epstein & Jeffrey L. Snyder, International Liti-
gation: A Guide to Jurisdiction, Practice and Strategy ch. 7 (2d ed. 1996).
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of provisions that continue to divide courts and create uncertainty. The objective of this
Report is to propose clarifications and improvements on issues that have posed problems
for users of the Act while trying to avoid policy judgments and politically sensitive areas.
Since its enactment in 1976, the structure and language of the Act have challenged courts.
The structure of the Act, unusually and perhaps uniquely, intertwines the substantive federal
law on foreign sovereign immunity with personal jurisdiction and federal court subject-
matter jurisdiction. The provision forbidding jury trials in federal courts is buried and
awkwardly worded.4 Courts lamented the absence of a real definition of "commercial ac-
tivity" and the circularity of the definitions that the Act does contain,5 and, as this Report
will show, found other difficulties with interpreting and applying various parts of the Act.
The courts have adequately addressed and resolved many of the problems with the FSIA,
but many problems remain. The courts continue to struggle with the complicated statute
and reach different and contradictory interpretations on a variety of important issues. For
example, does the definition of "foreign state" apply to heads of state, individual officials,
or second- and third-tier subsidiaries? Can and should the provisions on executing judg-
ments be improved and strengthened? What connection with the United States should a
foreign state's commercial activity have before a U.S. court proceeds to decide the case? At
the moment, inconsistencies and circuit conflicts exist on these and other questions.
Given the inconsistencies and contradictions in judicial interpretations of parts of the
FSIA and the complexity of other parts and given the long history of involvement of the
ABA with the FSIA,6 the International Litigation Committee of the Section of International
Law and Practice created a Working Group in mid-1998 to examine these issues and the
experience with the FSIA since its enactment in 1976. The mission of the Working Group
was to evaluate the operation and application of the Act and consider whether any legislative
improvements or clarifications should be recommended.
The intention was to improve and clarify the language and areas of the Act that have
divided courts or that are potentially ambiguous or confusing. With these reforms and
clarifications, the goal was to have the Act provide greater certainty and predictability on
legal issues important to foreign states and those having contact with them and to courts
and practitioners. The recommendations usually follow the rule reached by a majority of
courts but often are more than technical corrections and, in a few instances, would alter
existing law. The Working Group sought to make its recommendations consistent with the
Constitution and international law as well as to conform with the general purposes, objec-
tives, policies, and values in the current statute and the current legislative history and work
within the framework of the existing law. We did not attempt to write an entirely new
statute. The Working Group therefore often proposed no change to statutory language
when judicial interpretations have largely resolved potential ambiguity or confusion.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2002).
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d) (2002).
5. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 358-59 (1993); Andreas F. Lowenfield, Litigating a Sovereign
Immunity Claim-The Haiti Case, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 377, 435 n.244 (1974).
6. At the August 1976 meeting of the House of Delegates, the ABA adopted a resolution urging approval
of the bill that became the FSIA. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6608. At various times, the Section of International
Law and Practice had a committee on revision of the FSIA. See Mark B. Feldman, The United States Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of1976 in Perspective:A Founder's View, 35 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 302 n* (1986). In 1984,
the House of Delegates approved a recommendation from the Section of International Law and Practice to
adopt certain amendments to the FSIA, several of which were enacted in 1988.
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The Working Group sought, to the extent possible, to avoid issues of political sensitivity
and recommendations proposing policy judgments or value choices that would have new
and significant implications for the domestic or foreign policy of the United States. For
example, knowing that international human rights issues in connection with the FSIA are
controversial and have been the subject of congressional attention in recent years, the
Working Group decided not to propose changes to the judgments Congress already made
in the area and to leave the state of the law where it is. The Working Group also decided
not to address whether the FSIA applies in criminal cases.
The Working Group did not address the maritime exceptions from immunity. We defer
to the work periodically done by the Maritime Law Association on those provisions.
B. JURISDICTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE FSIA
The FSIA provides that, subject to certain exceptions, foreign states are immune from
suit in U.S. courts. The FSIA also specifies the conditions under which there is statutory
personal and subject matter jurisdiction in suits against foreign states. The FSIA is struc-
tured so that the issues of personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and immunity
from suit are intertwined. If proper service is made on a foreign state defendant,7 statutory
personal jurisdiction exists with respect to any claim for which there is federal subject matter
jurisdiction.' Federal subject matter jurisdiction exists "as to any claim for relief in personam
with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity."9 And the FSIA in turn
specifies various exceptions to sovereign immunity. 0 Under this structure, a court must
determine whether the foreign state defendant is immune from suit to determine whether
the court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction. If the court finds that the defendant
is immune, the court lacks personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Conversely, if the court
finds that there is an exception to immunity, and that proper service has been made, the
court automatically has personal and subject matter jurisdiction (assuming no violation of
due process requirements)."
This structure is confusing, appears to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction with
insufficient contacts, and creates the danger of unnecessary and potentially burdensome
discovery to prove exceptions from immunity, thereby undermining one of the benefits of
sovereign immunity. 2 One possible reform would be alter the structure so that the issues
of subject matter and/or personal jurisdiction would be separated in some way from the
issue of sovereign immunity, but, after considering the matter, the Working Group con-
cluded that no amendment is necessary. Courts have become familiar with the structure,' 3
7. The rules for service of process on foreign states and agencies and instrumentalities appear in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1608.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
10. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607.
11. The Supreme Court has held that the FSIA provides the exclusive basis for obtaining jurisdiction over
foreign states in U.S. courts. See Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. at 434.
12. Arriba Ltd. V. Petroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1992).
13. See Amerada Hess Shipping, 488 U.S. 428 (1989) ("Sections 1604 and 1330(a) work in tandem: § 1330(a)
confers jurisdiction on district court to hear suits brought by United States citizens and by aliens when a foreign
state is not entitled to imnunity"); see also Nelson, 507 U.S. at 355; Whitehead v. The Grand Duchy of Lux.,
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22307, at *10 (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1998); Wolf v. Federal Republic of Germany, 95 F.3d
536, 540-41 (7th Cir. 1996); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1469-70 (9th Cir. 1994); Trans Chem.
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and altering the structure could raise a constitutional issue in certain cases if the question
of immunity is not raised at the outset. 14 Courts also have been alert to the need to address
the potential due process concern of exercising personal jurisdiction over a foreign state or
instrumentality with few contacts with the United States 5 and to protect foreign state
defendants from burdensome discovery before resolving the immunity issue. 6
C. ENTITIES AND PERSONS ENTITLED TO PRESUMPTIVE IMMUNITY
The scope of the current FSIA, that is, the definition of the entities and persons entitled
to presumptive immunity, raises several concerns. The scope of the Act is important not
only because those covered by the FSIA are entitled to presumptive immunity but also
because they enjoy many procedural protections even when an exception from immunity
applies. 7 The concerns are with the ambiguity of the definition of "foreign state," the
occasional difficulty in distinguishing between a foreign state and an "instrumentality,"
confusion about whether the FSIA applies to corporations indirectly owned by foreign states
or owned by two or more foreign states, the absence of any reference to individuals such
as government officials, and the appropriate time for determining when an entity qualifies
for coverage under the Act.
1. Distinguishing Between Foreign States and Instrumentalities
The phrase "foreign state" is confusing because it has a dual definition; it sometimes
means both states and instrumentalities and sometimes means just states. This has led to
difficulties in interpreting the Act. An example is the tiering and pooling issue discussed
below. The definitions of "foreign state" and "agency or instrumentality" therefore should
be separated for all purposes. For clarity and convenience, we also propose shortening the
phrase "agency or instrumentality" to just "instrumentality."
In addition, the courts disagree about the method for distinguishing parts of a foreign
state from instrumentalities. The Working Group concluded that the "legal char-
acteristics"'" test rather than the "core functions'" test better serves the goals of the Act.
The Supreme Court recognized that the legal characteristics test is the standard estab-
lished in international law for determining whether an entity has autonomy from the
Ltd. v. China Nat'l Mach. Import & Export Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266, 276 (S.D. Tex. 1997), aff'd, 161 F.3d
314 (5th Cir. 1998).
14. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
15. See, e.g., Theo. H. Davis & Co. v. Republic of the Marshall Islands, 161 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 1998);
Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1545-46 (1 th Cir. 1993); Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871 F.2d
1515, 1529 (9th Cir. 1989). In evaluating whether there are minimum contacts, courts have looked to whether
there are sufficient contacts with the nation as a whole rather than with any particular state. See, e.g., Antoine
v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 111 (6th Cir. 1995); Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 523
(9th Cir. 1987). The Working Group takes no position on whether a foreign state is a person for purposes of
the due process clause. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992).
16. In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
17. A defendant within the scope of the Act receives a variety of procedural benefits including the following:
the absence of the plaintiff's right to a jury trial in federal court, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1441(d), the right to
remove a state case to federal court, id. § 1441(d), the right to special service of process requirements, id. § 1608,
and the right to special protections from pre-judgment attachment and execution, id. §§ 1609-11.
18. See Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Jane H. Griggs, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act: Do Tiered Corporate Subsidiaries Constitute Foreign States? 20 W. NEw ENG. L. REV.
387, 413-19 (1998) (discussing Hyatt).
19. See, e.g., Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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state, 0 and, based on the plain meaning of the FSIA, it appears to be the test that Congress
contemplated. The core functions test is vague and subjective, difficult to apply, and, as a
practical matter, duplicative of the commercial activity analysis more appropriately applied
later to determine whether the defendant is immune. Courts should determine whether an
entity is separate from the foreign state itself by reviewing legal characteristics such as
whether the entity maintains a distinct personality, was sufficiently capitalized, observes
corporate formalities, contracts in its own name, and is able to sue and be sued. Although
ministries, departments, the armed forces, and independent regulatory agencies occasionally
have some of these characteristics, the definition of foreign state should make clear that the
state includes these entities because they are traditionally viewed as part of the state itself
and because they have structural characteristics closely connecting them to the state.
2. Tiered and Pooled Entities
In today's world of complex legal structures, two situations often arise that create sub-
stantial uncertainty about the appropriate application of the Act to instrumentalities. First,
a corporation might not be directly majority owned by a foreign state but instead might be
majority owned by another corporation that, in turn, is directly majority owned by a foreign
state ("tiered" entity). Second, a corporation might be directly majority owned by two or
more foreign states, with each state individually owning less than 50 percent of the cor-
poration ("pooled" entity).
Because of ambiguous statutory language, the courts have struggled with whether such
tiered and pooled entities fit within the FSIA's definition of a corporation majority owned
by a foreign state and thus whether such entities enjoy the many protections that the FSIA
affords." The conflicting opinions of courts have undermined the FSIA's goal of achieving
consistency and uniform decisionmaking in cases involving foreign sovereigns.
The Section and Working Group initially proposed a recommendation to apply pre-
sumptive sovereign immunity to corporations indirectly majority owned by foreign states
but withdrew it because the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the tiering
issue in Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 E3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W
20. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Commercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
21. The position of the majority of courts is that corporations indirectly owned by a foreign state through
intermediary parent corporations fall within the FSIA. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana,
96 F.3d 932, 939-41 (7th Cir. 1996); Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc., 66 F.3d 105, 109 (6th Cir. 1995); Linton
v. Airbus Indus., 30 F.3d 592, 598 n.29 (5th Cir. 1994) (dicta), appeal dismissed, 30 F.3d 592 (5th Cir. 1994);
Straub v. AP Green, Inc., 38 F.3d 448, 451 (9th Cir. 1994); Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022, 1026
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Trump Taj Mahal Assoc. v. Construzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, S.p.A., 761 F.
Supp. 1143, 1148-50 (D.NJ. 1991), aff'd without opinion, 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1992). Other courts held that
corporations indirectly owned by a foreign state do not fall within FSIA. See, e.g., Gates v. Victor Fine Foods,
54 F.3d 1457, 1461-63 (9th Cir. 1995); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Richard L. Rubin & Co., 12 F.3d 1270, 1285 n.12 (3d
Cir. 1993) (dicta); Stanton, 945 F. Supp. at 685-90; Martinez v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 95-3212, 1996 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13180, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 1996); Gardiner Stone Hunter Int'l v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de
Espana, S.A., 896 F. Supp. 125, 130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Most courts have allowed a corporation to "pool" the interests of all of the foreign states to reach the majority
ownership required by section 1603(b)(2). See, e.g., Roselawn, 96 F.3d at 937-39. Mangattu v. M/VIBN Hayyan,
35 F.3d 205, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1994); LeDonne v. Gulf Air, Inc. 700 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (E.D. Va. 1988). A
few courts have expressed hesitation in allowing pooling. One court, for example, noted that the statutory text
of section 1603(b)(2) literally requires majority ownership "by a foreign state," not "states," and that Congress
could have explicitly allowed majority ownership "by a foreign state or states" but failed to do so. See Linton,
794 F. Supp. at 652.
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3791 (U.S. June 28, 2002) (No. 01-593). The Court's decision should rectify the problems
resulting from the lack of consistency and uniformity.
To achieve consistency and promote the other purposes of the FSIA, Congress should
amend the Act to clarify that a foreign corporation may receive presumptive immunity by
"pooling" the ownership interests of two or more foreign states to satisfy the majority-
ownership requirement. Permitting pooling promotes the foreign policy concerns of the
FSIA and has less serious implications for United States plaintiffs. The foreign policy in-
terests of the United States are affected whether foreign states are sued individually or as
part of a group, and a suit against a corporation 95 percent directly owned by two foreign
states likely will have as great or greater foreign policy implications as a suit against a
corporation 51 percent owned by one foreign state.
The pooling recommendation potentially creates confusion because the International
Organizations Immunities Act ("IOIA") applies to some entities owned by more than one
state, such as the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. To avoid any
possible overlap of the FSIA and the IOIA, the proposal contains a provision stating that
the FSIA does not apply to entities designated under the IOIA. This provision is not meant
to address any other possible relationship between the FSIA and the IOIA and is not meant
to comment in any way on the privileges and immunities to which IOIA entities are entitled.
3, Time for Determining Status
The courts have been inconsistent in deciding the time at which a defendant may be
considered a foreign state or instrumentality when the status of the defendant has changed
between the time the claim arose and the time the claim is filed. The most common ap-
proach is for courts to make the decision based on the status of the defendant at the time
the claim arose.2 Other courts have found that the inquiry should be made at the time the
claim is filed, 3 and a few courts have found that either time is acceptable1
4
The Section and Working Group initially proposed a recommendation to apply the Act
to defendants that are foreign states or instrumentalities at either the time the claim arose
or the time the complaint is filed but withdrew the recommendation for the same reason
the tiering proposal was withdrawn. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review
22. See Per6 v. Nuovo Pignone, Inc., 150 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 1998); Gen. Elec. Capital Co. v. Grossman,
991 F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 1993); Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445 (6th Cir. 1988); In re
Chase & Sanborn Corp., 835 F.2d 1341 (11th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Daly v.
Llanes, 30 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica de Venezuela, 21 F.
Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 200 F.3d 843 (D.C. Cir. 2000); In re Aircrash DisasterNear
Monroe, 987 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Trans. Chem. Ltd., 978 F. Supp. 266; Delgado v. Shell Oil Co.,
890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Kern v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 525 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
23. See Straub, 38 F.3d 448; Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 639 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (finding that "jurisdictional questions are generally determined as of the date upon which the complaint
was filed"), vacated, 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversal based on Second Circuit's finding that Palau did
not qualify as a foreign state because it did not possess attributes of foreign sovereignty); Ocasek v. Flintkote
Co., 796 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Il1. 1992) (finding that FSIA immunity would not apply where defendant was a
foreign state at the time events occurred but was not a foreign state by the time the complaint was filed);
Tjontveit v. Den Norske Bank, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22802 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 1997), vacated on other
grounds, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11929 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 1998) (defendant entitled to protections of the
FSIA because although private when acts occurred, it had become public by the time the suit was filed; vacated
on grounds offorum non conveniens).
24. See, e.g., Belgrade v. Sidex Int'l Furniture Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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the timing issue in Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., 251 E3d 795 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted,
70 U.S.L.W 3791 (U.S. June 28, 2002) (No. 01-593).
4. Heads of State, Government Officials, and Employees of Instrumentalities
Courts have periodically been obliged to consider whether individuals who are heads of
state or who are officials or employees of foreign states or of instrumentalities of foreign
states are covered by the immunities under the Act. The text of the FSIA is silent on the
point, but a majority of courts that have considered the issue have concluded that, under
certain circumstances, an individual officer or employee of a foreign state or instrumentality
may receive immunity under the Act.2" No court has applied the FSIA to a head of state,
but one leading district court opinion and some other courts found a comparable common
law immunity that depends for the most part on a suggestion of immunity from the U.S.
Department of State.
2 6
The current position of the courts should be codified but in a way that does not interfere
with the evolution of the law on head-of-state immunity. The scope of the Act should be
explicitly expanded to include officials or employees of foreign states or instrumentalities
acting in an official capacity (and who are not otherwise U.S. citizens or permanent resi-
dents). Litigation of questions involving the immunities of individuals has been common
in U.S. courts. These cases present controversial situations and could be a source of conflict
with other countries because cases against foreign officials are often no more than cases
against the foreign state or the instrumentality. A congressional codification of a rule ex-
tending foreign sovereign immunity to individuals is preferable to the potentially inconsis-
tent and uncertain application of judicially-created standards. With appropriate new pro-
visions for service on individuals, the recommended approach would be to treat government
officials as part of the foreign state and to treat directors and employees of an instrumentality
as part of the instrumentality. The individuals would retain immunity and, when an excep-
tion from immunity applies, would be subject to legal action in the United States in the
same circumstances as the foreign state or instrumentality. This is the appropriate result
because it would ensure that the individuals receive the procedural protections of the Act
while providing potentially aggrieved plaintiffs an opportunity to obtain relief when foreign
officials cause injury within the scope of their duties but outside of protected sovereign
functions. The proposed amendments would contain provisions expressly preserving dip-
lomatic, consular, and other immunity from suit and service under any treaty, other inter-
national agreement, or other federal statute of the United States.
The Working Group does not recommend that the FSIA apply to foreign heads of state
and takes no position on the issue. Although several reasons to include heads of state within
the Act exist, the proper treatment of heads of state should be left to the appropriate
authorities to continue to develop. The position of the Executive Branch is that the ability
25. See Phaneuf v. Republic of Indonesia, 106 F. 3d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1997); EI-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of
Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Although EI-Fadl claims to be suing Marto in an individual
capacity, the only evidence in the record shows that Marto's activities in managing PIBC were neither personal
nor private, but were undertaken only on behalf of the Central Bank."); Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493,497-
98 (9th Cir. 1992); Chuidian v. Phil. Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990); Intercontinental Dictionary
Serv. v. De Gruyter, 822 F. Supp. 662, 674 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
26. See, e.g., Alicog v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp. 379, 382 (S.D. Tex. 1994), aff'd merm., 79
F.3d 1145 (5th Cir. 1996); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Saltany v. Reagan,
702 F. Supp. 319, 320 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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to suggest head-of-state immunity in appropriate cases is important to preserve U.S. foreign
policy interests. Because of the recommendation to have the Act cover foreign government
officials, a proposed provision would make explicit that the Act is not intended to supersede
head-of-state immunity.
D. THE WAIVER EXCEPTION
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides that a foreign state will not receive
immunity if it "has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding
any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect except in ac-
cordance with the terms of the waiver."27 This language leaves several important questions
unanswered. First, it is not clear what, if any, nexus is required for a court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a foreign state in this situation. Second, it is not clear what con-
tractual language or foreign state conduct is sufficient to constitute a waiver "by implica-
tion." Third, it is not clear what law courts should apply in determining whether an indi-
vidual or entity has authority to waive a foreign state's immunity.
On the first question, although there have been concerns about the absence of a require-
ment connecting an explicit waiver to the territory of the United States, no amendment to
the current statutory language is needed as long as courts satisfy themselves, using tradi-
tional methods of contract interpretation, that a foreign state or instrumentality's waiver
was a consent to be sued in the United States. Second, because courts rarely find an implied
waiver and because of the costs and uncertainties associated with the provision on implied
waivers, the Working Group proposes to amend the FSIA to limit implied waivers to those
situations in which a foreign state or instrumentality participates as a defendant in litigation
without properly raising or preserving a defense of sovereign immunity. To address the
third question, the statute should be amended to include language specifying the choice-
of-law rule for determining a person's actual or apparent authority to waive sovereign
immunity.
E. THE COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY EXCEPTION
The exception from immunity for commercial activity is one of the most significant
exceptions in the Act and was the foundation for the emergence of the restrictive theory of
immunity embraced by the Act. The statutory language of the exception initially raised a
variety of questions, but the courts have made significant progress in resolving them, such
as the meaning of the "based upon" requirement 28 and of the phrase "commercial activity."29
Some potential confusion about the meaning of "commercial activity" remains, but an
amendment to the statutory language could not completely solve the problem, and courts
should be able to deal with any questions that occur.
The only significant change the Working Group recommends for the commercial activity
exception is to require a "substantial" and direct effect in the United States when applying
the third clause dealing with commercial activity and acts occurring outside of the United
States. The Supreme Court's construction of the current "direct effect" language0 has
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2002).
28. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 356-58 (Souter,J.), 364 (White,J.), 370 (Kennedy, J.) (1993).
29. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614; see also id. at 359-61.
30. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619.
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caused confusion and disagreements in the lower courts3 and permits U.S. courts to resolve
commercial cases having only the most distant relationship with the United States. 2 The
proposed additional word "substantial" should mean significant or weighty in relation to
all of the circumstances of the case and its connections with the United States. Failure to
provide a service or good in the United States would usually qualify, as would a concerted
refusal to deal by foreign producers aimed at U.S. buyers; a financial loss by a U.S. person
or at a U.S. bank account by itself would not.
F. THE TORT EXCEPTION
The FSIA contains an exception to immunity for case, not otherwise covered by the
commercial activity exception, involving tort claims for "personal injury or death, or dam-
age to or loss of property, occurring in the United States." This exception does not apply
to claims "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function" or "any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights."
The scope of this exception should be clarified. First, the language requiring the tort to
have some connection with the United States should be amended to specify that the tort
exception apply whenever a substantial portion of the tortious act or omission occurs in the
United States. Although the current language of the exception makes it clear that the injury
or damage in question must occur with the United States, there is no express requirement
that the tortious act or omission also must occur in the United States. As most courts have
held, 3 there should be a territorial restriction on the tortious act or omission. As courts
have explained, if there are no territorial restriction on the tortious act or omission, foreign
sovereigns could be subject to suit in U.S. courts for tortious conduct committed anywhere
in the world, so long as the conduct had effects in the United States. These cases would
likely be especially offensive to foreign sovereigns, raise difficult questions of causation, and
burden an already overloaded federal court system. With a requirement for conduct in the
United States, the current requirement that the injury or damage occur in the United States
could be eliminated, especially since determining where the injury or damage occurs can
be complicated and difficult.
To accommodate multi-country tort situations, the statute should require only that a
"substantial portion" of the acts or omissions occur in the United States. This requirement
would ensure that the tort exception is limited to situations in which there is a significant
connection between the tort and the United States, while at the same time avoiding the
inequity of disallowing claims just because some of the conduct took place outside of the
United States.
The second amended proposed by the Working Group is to clarify that the limitations
on the tort exception-for discretionary functions and for certain torts such as libel and
31. See Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Bank of China, 142 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 1998); Hanil Bank v.
PT. Bank Negara Indon., 148 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 1998); Adler v. Fed. Republic of Niger., 107 F.3d 720 (9th
Cir. 1997); Goodman Holdings v. Rafidain Bank, 26 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (D.D. Cir. 1994).
32. See Hanil Bank, 148 F.3d 127.
33. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 441 (dicta); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 379-80 (7th Cir. 1985); Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 842-43
(D.C. Cir. 1984); In re SEDCO, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 567 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
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defamation-do not apply to the commercial activity exception. When the commercial
activity exception applies, the adjudication of misrepresentation, defamation, and similar
claims is unlikely to pose serious foreign relations difficulties given the commercial context
of the cases. Moreover, when foreign states act like private entities in the market, the
restrictive theory of immunity suggests that they should be subject to the full range of
claims available against private entities. Private entities, of course, have no immunity when
they engage in conduct such as defamation or misrepresentation. This second proposed
amendment is consistent with the majority view in the courts.3 4
A final issue important in some international human rights cases is whether the discre-
tionary function limitation applies to illegal activity. Although there is some disagreement
in courts over the legality issue," the discretionary function provision need not be altered
at this time. There is no severe conflict of authority, and courts should continue addressing
the issue on a case-by-case basis because of the foreign relations issues.
G. SERVICE OF PROCESS
In FSIA cases several issues concerning service of process exist. The FSIA contains sepa-
rate service of process provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1608 for foreign states and for instrumen-
talities. Courts disagree over whether strict compliance with these service requirements is
necessary. Some courts find "substantial compliance" with service rules adequate, at least
for instrumentalities, although courts differ on what constitutes substantial compliance.36
The recommendation is that courts should strictly enforce service rules on both foreign
states and instrumentalities, and new statutory language should be added to make clear that
substantial compliance with service rules is not acceptable. Most courts agree that the ser-
vice rules should be strictly followed when a foreign state is the defendant. The substantial
compliance rule is difficult to apply uniformly, and in the FSIA cases it has a potential
adverse effect on international relations, comity, and the enforceability of U.S. judgments.
Including the strict compliance rule in the statute will correct the approach followed by a
minority of courts and will prevent future departures from the appropriate rule.
A strict compliance rule also should apply to instrumentalities. Although many instru-
mentalities engage in commerce, they differ from private entities because one or more
foreign states hold ultimate majority ownership of them. Thus, service on an instrumentality
implicates concerns about avoiding disruption to the foreign relations of the United States.
In any event, many courts reject the substantial compliance approach in litigation between
private parties and require full compliance with a method of delivery specified in a statute
or rule." Although plaintiffs may sometimes encounter special difficulties in serving foreign
34. See, e.g., Southway Cent. Bank of Nig., 198 F.3d 1210, 1219 (10th Cir. 199); Exp. Group v. Reef Indus.,
Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1473-76 (9th Cir. 1995); Southway v. Cent. Bank ofNig., 994 F. Supp. 1299, 1310-11 (D.
Colo. 1998); Yucyco, Ltd. v. Republic of Slov., 984 F. Supp. 209,224 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Butsee Bryksv. Canadian
Broad. Corp., 906 F. Supp. 204, 208-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (defamation claims could not be brought under the
commercial activity exception because of the exclusion of such claims in the tort exception).
35. See, e.g., Risk v. Halvorson, 936 F.2d 393, 396-97 (9th Cir. 1991); Liu v. P.R.C., 892 F.2d 1419, 1431
(9th Cir. 1989); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980).
36. See, e.g., Straub, 38 F.3d 448; Shererv. ConstuccionesAeronauticus, S.A., 987 F.2d 1246 (6th Cir. 1993).
37. Veeckv. Comty. Enters. Inc., 487 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1973) (in personam jurisdiction can be obtained
only by defendant's voluntary appearance in the action or service of the court's process on him in strict con-
formance with a valid statute authorizing it"; see also R. Griggs Group Ltd. v. Filanto Spa., 920 F. Supp. 1100,
1103 (D. Nev. 1996); Leab v. Streit, 584 F. Supp. 748 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). But see Sanderford v. Prudential Ins.
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sovereign defendants, a substantial compliance rule is not necessary to address these situ-
ations. Instead, courts can, for example, allow a plaintiff additional time to cure the defi-
ciency and re-serve the defendant in accordance with the Act. Courts also would retain the
authority to find proper service when a minor technical defect in the form of a service
document exists, as long as the method of delivery was in conformance with the rule.
In addition, there should be some adjustments to the part of section 1608 permitting
courts to authorize use of a special method of service on an instrumentality when a plaintiff
cannot effect service or has difficulty effecting service by one of the methods explicitly
described in section 1608. The adjustments would ensure that a specially developed method
of service is not prohibited by international agreement and does not violate foreign law.
Under the recommended approach, the provision would apply to an instrumentality, di-
rector, officer, or employee of an instrumentality, but would not apply to foreign states
proper (service by diplomatic channels under section 1608(a)(4) would continue to be the
last resort for service on a foreign state) or foreign government officials (service by mail
requiring a signed receipt and sent by the clerk of the court would be the last resort for
service on a foreign official).
H. EXECUTION
The FSIA has three sections addressing immunity from execution. Section 1609 estab-
lishes the general presumption of immunity "from attachment arrest and execution except
as provided in sections 1610 and 1611." Section 1610(a) creates various exceptions from
execution immunity for foreign states and instrumentalities. Section 1610(b) provides for
additional exceptions from execution immunity for "property in the United States of an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity in the United
States." Finally, section 1611 defines certain types of property that are always immune
from execution.
Several factors combine to make execution against foreign states unduly restrictive.38 As
a threshold matter, section 16 10(a) requires that the property against which attachment in
aid of execution or execution is sought must be "used for a commercial activity in the United
States." A party seeking execution against a foreign state must also satisfy an additional
exception in section 1610(a). Section 1610(a)(2), for example, grants an exception for exe-
cution against property that "is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the
claim is based." When read with the introductory language of section 1610(a) limiting
execution to commercial property in the United States, a plaintiff has a double burden of
seeking execution against a foreign sovereign. Moreover, only in rare instances would a
foreign state have property in the United States "used" for the activity giving rise to the
claim. In many cases, such as those involving a foreign state's failure to pay for U.S. goods
or services or breach of an employment contract or lease, no property of the foreign state
related to the claim exists at all, much less in the United States.
Co. of Am., 902 F.2d 897 (11 th Cir. 1990) (defendant waived defense of insufficient service when it did not
respond to a summons that was in substantial compliance with Rule 4).
38. Successful plaintiffs have encountered difficulty in enforcing judgments even when the court had found
that it otherwise properly had jurisdiction to adjudicate over the foreign sovereign. See, e.g., De Letelier v.
Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984); LNC Inv., Inc. v. Republic of Nicar., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7814 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2000); Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Gov't of Republic of Liber., 659 F. Supp. 606
(D.D.C. 1987).
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There is also no specific exception in section 1610(a) for noncommercial tort cases. In-
stead, there is simply an exception (in section 1610(a)(6) for "liability or casualty insurance
covering the claim which merged into the judgment." The exception is inadequate to ad-
dress potential liability from torts in the United States because insurance might not exist,
might not exist in sufficient amount, or might not qualify as property in the United States.
To address these problems, execution against foreign states should be simplified by per-
mitting execution of a judgment based on a claim for which the foreign state is not immune
against any property in the United States used for a commercial activity. The immunity of
specific categories of property would be retained, although the protections for property
covered by diplomatic or consular immunity would be clarified. This approach would elim-
inate the requirement in section 1610(a)(2) that execution in a commercial activity case be
limited to property related to the same commercial activity. It also would provide an exe-
cution remedy for non-commercial tort cases covered by section 1605(a)(5) substantially
beyond the current exception for insurance proceeds. Because section 1610(a) applies to
executions against both foreign states and instrumentalities, these proposed simplifying
revisions would make the separate provisions on execution against instrumentalities in sec-
tion 1610(b) unnecessary. These changes would not affect Congress's recent amendments
relating to execution against blocked funds of certain foreign states.
I. PROTECTIONS FOR FOREIGN STATES To BALANCE NARROWED EXECUTION IMMUNITY
The narrowing of the FSIA's immunity for foreign states from attachment and execution
would create an imbalance between debtor protections and creditor rights for foreign states
in financial distress. While corporate bankruptcy rules provide orderly procedures to
balance the interests of creditors and private debtors, no such rules exist for foreign states.
At times, this void has created a variety of difficult issues for both creditors and debtor
countries.
One possible approach to this imbalance would be to grant courts explicit statutory au-
thority to stay proceedings or enforcement against foreign states in certain narrow circum-
stances. Courts have already found discretion to stay proceedings and regulate execution
of judgments in certain situations under a variety of legal principles and statutes. The
Supreme Court has held that federal courts have inherent authority to stay lawsuits, and
this power has been applied in lawsuits involving foreign parties.39 Moreover, federal courts
have denied prejudgment attachment orders and other relief against foreign states and
instrumentalities at least in part on the ground that such orders would create undue hard-
ship. 40 In fact, a provision of the current FSIA, section 1610, already provides a limited stay
of execution until the court determines that "a reasonable period of time has elapsed
39. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997); Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254
(1936); Can. Southern Ry. V. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883); Limonium Maritime, S.A.v. MizushimaMarinera,
S.A., 201 F.3d 431 (2d Cir. 1999); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reeferes Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985);
Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Ltd. v. Galadari, 777 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1985) (Dubai liquidation proceed-
ings); Pravin Banker Assoc. Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 165 B.R. 379, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2730 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997).
40. See Elliott Assoc. v. Republic of Peru, 948 F. Supp. 1203, 1213-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Meridien Int'l Bank
v. Liber., 1996 WL 22338 at *6 (S.D.N.Y.); Interpetrol Bermuda Ltd. v. Trinidad and Tobago Oil Co., 513
N.Y.S.2d 598, 604-05 (Sup. Ct. 1987); Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 702 F. Supp. 60, 66
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991).
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following the entry of judgment." Finally, some state and federal laws provide the courts
with specific authority to regulate the manner and timing of enforcement of judgments.4'
Thus, including explicit statutory authority for courts to grant a stay of proceedings or
execution of a judgment has merit as a possible way to address any imbalance between the
rights of creditors and the rights of sovereign debtors that currently exists or that might be
altered in favor of creditors if the recommendation to narrow execution immunity is
adopted. The Working Group decided not to recommend adoption of an explicit stay
provision, however. Proposals to address any imbalance should be considered in a context
larger than recommended reforms to the FSIA and as part of an examination of international
rules to protect foreign states in a manner similar to insolvency and bankruptcy codes. That
larger context is beyond the scope of this FSIA work, but an effort should be undertaken
to consider the larger set of issues, especially if narrower execution immunity for foreign
states is adopted.
41. See N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5240 (McKinney 1999); Federal Debt Collection Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 3013
(2002).
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